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Abstract 
Public policy can affect many different gender inequalities. However, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the effects of policy on gender inequalities within 
households. This paper analyses a range of family-related policy changes over the 
last fifteen years in Australia, Germany and the UK to compare their potential 
effects on intra-household gender inequalities. These include changes in parental 
leave policies, working time regulation, childcare support and financial support to 
families. Many of these changes are found to have contradictory effects on within 
household inequalities, mainly because those that improve women’s incomes in 
their current gender roles may also undermine incentives to challenge traditional 
gender roles. All three countries have implemented substantial reforms over the 
period considered. However, with labour market activation policies tending to 
favour an inherently unequal one-and-a-half earner household, the effects on 
inequalities within households did not meet increasingly egalitarian gender role 
attitudes. 
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Resumen 
Las políticas públicas pueden afectar a muy diversas desigualdades de género. Sin 
embargo, se ha prestado escasa atención a los efectos de la política sobre las 
desigualdades de género dentro de los hogares. En este trabajo se analiza una 
serie de cambios relativos a políticas familiares que se han dado en los últimos 
quince años en Australia, Alemania y el Reino Unido, para comparar sus efectos 
potenciales sobre las desigualdades de género dentro del hogar. Éstos incluyen 
cambios en las políticas de licencias parentales, la regulación de la jornada laboral, 
el apoyo al cuidado infantil y el apoyo financiero a las familias. Muchos de estos 
cambios han tenido efectos contradictorios en las desigualdades dentro de los 
hogares, sobre todo debido a que los que mejoran los ingresos de las mujeres en 
sus roles actuales de género también pueden socavar los incentivos para desafiar 
los roles tradicionales de género. Los tres países han llevado a cabo reformas 
sustanciales en el período referido. Sin embargo, con las políticas de activación del 
mercado de trabajo que tienden a favorecer a un hogar de una sola fuente de 
ingresos y medios inherentemente desiguales, los efectos sobre las desigualdades 
dentro de los hogares no cumplieron con las actitudes cada vez más igualitarias en 
cuanto a roles de género. 
Palabras clave 
Desigualdades dentro del hogar; políticas familiares; roles de género; ingresos 
individuales 
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of research has identified the importance of intra-household 
inequalities, especially in access to financial resources (Lundberg and Pollak 1996, 
Agarwal 1997, Friedberg and Webb 2006, Vogler et al. 2008). However, the impact 
of public policies on such intra-household inequalities has not been the subject of 
extensive research or political interest. This is urgently needed because many 
policies designed for quite different purpose have effects on intra-household 
inequalities. Knowing about such effects is important for two reasons: first because, 
intra-household inequality is a significant aspect of gender inequality overall, and 
second, because any policy will be designed more effectively if account is taken of 
any intra-household behavioural effects that may impede or help meet its goals. 
Both the European Union and the OECD in practice promote the so-called “adult 
worker model”, whereby individuals of both sexes are generally expected to take 
employment (Lewis and Giullari 2005). This has required some attention to helping 
people, in practice women, reconcile care responsibilities with employment and has 
resulted in countries developing hybrid models of adult worker families, with 
ambiguous discourses on the roles and relationships of the individuals making up a 
household. Such policies have been driven by concerns to raise revenues and 
promote individual/family self-reliance and agency, by shifting the costs of social 
protection from the state to the individual or family. They have not usually been 
motivated by concern to tackle intra-household inequalities in employment and care 
responsibilities or in access to financial resources nor, as is more frequently noted, 
by concern with gender equality more generally (Lewis et al. 2008). Most policy 
developments have emphasized agency (or “choice” as it is more usually put) at 
the level of the family, stopping short of engaging with how individual members 
within households make this happen. This is problematic because taking account of 
what goes on within households is fundamental to designing effective policy 
instruments to incentivise individual behaviour or target particular individuals, as 
well as to reduce gender inequalities (Haddad and Kanbur 1990, see also Bargain et 
al. 2006 for a review). 
This paper will investigate how family-related policies, broadly defined, usually 
designed with goals other than gender equality in mind, have influenced intra-
household inequalities. Comparing the UK, Germany and Australia, we investigate 
how a changing hierarchy of social and economic goals have been pursued in 
designing such policies in these countries. We show that policies may have 
contradictory effects on different aspects of intra-household inequalities, mainly on 
access to individual income and the sharing of caring and earning roles. 
The three countries chosen offer an interesting contrast for our analysis as they 
represent different types of welfare states and institutional contexts (Esping-
Andersen 1990, see also Meulders and O’Dorchai 2007 for some feminist critiques 
and enhancements of this classification). Australia and the UK are usually classified 
as liberal welfare states, in which individual choice and market solutions to social 
needs are cornerstones; they are also both members of the Commonwealth with 
strong cultural and historical links. Germany is conventionally defined as a 
conservative welfare state, but has an interesting history due to the unification of 
East and West. It belongs, like the UK, but unlike Australia, to the EU, so is bound 
by regulations developed at the European level, notably its Lisbon strategy whereby 
gender equality objectives became integrated into employment policy. All three 
countries are members of the OECD and subject to the pressures of globalisation. 
Finally, all had a significant change of government in the 1990s which resulted in 
reforms relevant to the concerns of this paper, and then another change in the 
2000s. 
As we shall see, all three countries have had similar patterns of gender inequalities 
in employment, pay and the allocation of care responsibilities, although stemming 
from different political histories. While in all the one-and-a-half earner couple is the 
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most frequent type, this has been true for longer in the UK (OECD 2013). Australia 
and Germany have been slower in encouraging maternal employment and both, in 
different recent periods, have had governments that explicitly promoted one-earner 
couples, with mothers taking full-time care of young children. They also have 
adopted more pro-natalist discourses than the UK, where policy discussion has not, 
up to now, shown any concern about the birth-rate (Fleckenstein 2010). 
This paper will focus on a limited number of policy areas whose major impact is on 
the factors identified in the economic literature as most likely to influence intra-
household inequalities: parental leave, working time, childcare and tax-benefit 
policies. By concentrating on these we limit the scope of our analysis in practice to 
working-age couples and also do not consider policies mainly affecting those whose 
care responsibilities are for adults. To keep the focus manageable, we have decided 
to restrict our attention to areas traditionally seen as comprising “family” or 
“family-friendly” policy, even though other policy areas, more traditionally seen as 
labour-market focused, such as anti-discrimination, equal pay and minimum wage 
legislation and the treatment of part-time workers, may have equally important 
effects on intra-household inequalities. Exploring the intra-household effects of 
policy more generally, and of other aspects of labour market policy in particular, is 
a task for a future research project. 
The next section reviews the literature on the factors affecting intra-household 
inequalities and considers its implications for policies to reduce such inequalities. 
The third section examines what this means for the four policy areas on which this 
paper focuses. The following two sections outline first the general political changes 
in our three countries since the mid-nineties and then the resulting policy 
developments in these four areas, with a discussion of the implications of these 
changes for intra-household inequalities. The final section concludes. 
2. Factors affecting intra-household inequality 
Intra-household inequality can have a number of different meanings. With respect 
to financial resources, it can mean inequality in entitlement to an individual income, 
“money in one’s own right”, though this is complicated by the existence of joint 
claims for welfare benefits and joint bank accounts. Qualitative research in the UK 
has shown that the source of individual income, according to whether it is net 
earnings, contributory or universal benefits, or means tested benefits, may give it 
different meanings within the household. Such research also suggests that while 
low to middle income couples may see their finances as closely connected, women 
tend to value having some money in their own right, while men more frequently 
resist the notion of anything but total sharing (Bennett et al. 2012). 
Women typically have less of such money in their own right than men, which may 
explain their greater sensitivity to it. Early feminist campaigns for women’s financial 
autonomy picked up on this, though exactly what was meant by financial autonomy 
is harder to pin down (Lister 2003). However, it is clear that reducing intra-
household inequalities in this respect requires less gender inequality in earnings, 
through closing gender gaps in both pay and hours of employment, and reducing 
the inequality in time spent out of the labour market for caring responsibilities. This 
last inequality is crucial because it both reduces immediate income and typically 
has long-term effects on earning ability (Joshi et al. 1999). Given the persistence of 
this inequality, policies that financially compensate those unable to earn because of 
caring responsibilities might help reduce immediate intra-household income 
inequalities, but would have to be well designed if they were not to be 
counterproductive by exacerbating longer-term inequalities (Himmelweit 2008). 
Intra-household inequality could also mean inequality in the benefits gained 
through the spending of a household’s resources. Economists’ models of intra-
household decision-making have concentrated on this, investigating the factors that 
influence a couple’s consumption of goods, and possibly leisure, by examining 
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household expenditure data and sometimes individual time-use data to derive 
hypotheses about the factors influencing relative power in household decision-
making more generally (Himmelweit et al. 2013). The initial “cooperative 
bargaining” models posited a couple as bargaining over the creation and use of 
pooled household resources. Relative power in such negotiations is determined by 
each partner’s fall-back position when cooperation breaks down, for example, their 
financial situation if they were on their own (including their potential earnings) or, 
how each would fare in their traditional gender role if the couple were to stay 
together but not cooperate (in which case a woman’s current individual income 
matters greatly to her bargaining power). Bargaining models therefore suggest that 
not only individual incomes and who receives payments matter to intra-household 
inequalities, but also more general institutional conditions under which men and 
women live, both as couples and singles (Mc Elroy 1990, Agarwal 1997, Folbre 
1997). In particular support for the living standards of lone parents matters, 
whether directly through welfare benefits and divorce settlements, or indirectly 
through enabling them to realise their labour market potential. 
More recently economists have turned to collective models, which investigate 
factors influencing cooperative outcomes empirically without requiring a bargaining 
framework based on fall-back positions, again usually measuring intra-household 
inequalities in terms of the consumption of goods and leisure. Under some 
assumptions, the factors influencing a “sharing rule” giving the portion of household 
resources each partner consumes can be determined (Himmelweit et al. 2013). 
Studies have found that, among other factors, each partner’s wage rate, share of 
household earnings and non-labour income (Bonke and Browning 2009) and the 
customary division of household wealth after divorce are all influential (Chiappori et 
al. 2002). Again policy can affect all of these. 
In theory, bargaining and collective models are relevant to household decisions in 
any domain, but in practice the data used to estimate them is more restricted so 
that they end up assessing intra-household inequality in terms of the consumption 
of goods, and in some cases leisure. But the benefits that household resources can 
bring to individuals are much wider. The feminist demand for financial autonomy 
mentioned above was trying to capture more than just consumption. Amartya Sen 
has suggested that the real benefits of resources are what they enable individuals 
to be or to do. Building on household bargaining models, Sen (1990) suggests that 
how partners’ contributions are valued by household members is key to 
determining the extent to which they benefit from household resources. For 
example, through gender norms concerning the importance of male breadwinning, 
women’s earnings may be valued less than men’s of the same amount; they also 
may be less reliable in practice because of the greater likelihood that a woman’s 
earnings would be reduced by caring responsibilities or by the less secure 
conditions under which many women are employed. Fulfilling caring responsibilities 
does not in general seem to be perceived to be as valuable as making a financial 
contribution to the household, and benefits paid to those taking on caring 
responsibilities may be less valued than earnings from employment (Bennett et al. 
2012, De Henau and Himmelweit 2013a, 2013b). 
There is also a large literature on intra-household inequalities in domestic labour. 
This is relevant to this paper not only as an inequality in its own right, but also 
because long hours of domestic work, or of home based child and elder care, feed 
intra-household inequalities in access to opportunities to spend time in other ways, 
in particular in employment and the benefits it brings in terms of current and future 
financial resources (Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz 2010). Thus promoting more equal 
sharing of domestic and caring duties is important in reducing intra-household 
inequalities not only in itself, but also in enabling women to gain intra-household 
bargaining power and share more equally in the benefits that household resources 
bring. 
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In sum the effectiveness of policies in tackling intra-household inequalities can be 
assessed against four main criteria, whether they: 
1. Reduce intra-household inequalities that directly affect individual access to 
income, not only within intact couples, but also after separation; 
2. Reduce inequalities in the distribution of caring and earning roles between 
partners that are known to influence individuals’ bargaining power and 
thus their benefits from household resources; 
3. Increase gender equality more generally in society by (a) tackling 
inequalities in the labour market or (b) reducing the disadvantages faced 
by those within couples and by single people in taking on caring 
responsibilities; 
4. Weaken gender norms that reinforce gender inequalities within households 
and more widely, in particular through the value attached to each of these 
gender roles. 
Conversely, policies that do the opposite may exacerbate intra-household 
inequalities. 
The above list goes from the specific to the more general. However, all are relevant 
to intra-household inequalities. In particular gender inequalities more widely in 
society affect intra-household inequalities both through making unequal earnings 
likely within couples and through the effects of men’s and women’s fall-back 
positions as singles on bargaining power within couples. Further, the gender norms 
that reinforce inequalities not only operate on household inequalities but are 
reproduced through those inequalities themselves. 
Policies can have effects that work in contradictory directions with respect to intra-
household inequalities of income and gender roles. In particular there is the well-
acknowledged problem that payments that boost the incomes of those out of the 
labour market for caring responsibilities (Criterion 1) may reinforce inequality of 
gender roles within the household (Criterion 2), by increasing the financial 
advantages of intra-household specialisation and thus disincentivising employment 
for the lower earner. And this will both reinforce and be reinforced by unequal 
conditions in the labour market (Criterion 3) and gender norms (Criterion 4), unless 
policies to tackle these are also introduced. 
3. Policy effects on intra-household inequalities 
Bearing in mind the interconnections between these four criteria we shall 
concentrate our analysis on four areas of family-related policy that impact 
particularly on individual incomes and gender roles within households (though 
noting where they might also be expected to have wider impacts on factors relevant 
to intra-household inequalities): parental leave, working-time, childcare and how 
tax-benefit policies deal with families. While these are by no means the only 
policies to have such effects, or even necessarily the strongest effects, they are 
chosen as those with the most direct effects on individual incomes and caring and 
earning roles between working-age couples. 
3.1. Parental leave 
Debates about the effect of parental leave on parent’s employment and sharing of 
parenting roles continue (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011). Relatively short-term 
(about six months), well-paid, job-protected leave improves the income of mothers 
of newborns and seems to keep them in employment (Ray et al. 2010, Moss 2012). 
Similar leave reserved for fathers, if taken for significant periods outside their 
partner’s leave period, are thought to promote intra-household equality in caring 
roles, beyond the immediate parental leave period. Although no country in the 
world has implemented fully individualised, well-paid leave of equal length for both 
parents, evidence from single elements of such a policy in different countries has 
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pointed towards its benefits in reducing gender inequalities more generally in 
society, by promoting more equal gender norms that value caring roles more highly 
(Gornick and Meyers 2003).  
However, in a world of gendered labour markets and norms, the take-up of 
parental leave is highly gendered with women tending to take most, often all, leave 
that is available to both parents, and men not even taking leave that is reserved for 
them alone if it is too badly paid (De Henau et al. 2007). While some leave is 
necessary to enable new mothers to stay in employment at all, gender inequality 
within households may be reinforced by the availability of longer leave, which 
reduces the woman’s income further, albeit temporarily. But the greater effects of 
long leave on intra-household inequalities may be in the woman’s reduced longer-
term career opportunities, while the man, frequently already the higher earner, is 
enabled to progress further in his career, unconstrained by care responsibilities. 
This inequality increases the longer and worse paid the leave is, also reinforcing 
labour market inequalities and gender norms more widely in society. 
3.2. Working-time regulations 
Flexible working arrangements, such as part-time working, flexitime and 
possibilities of home-working, provided they do not worsen pay, working conditions 
or employment rights and benefits, are likely to help individual workers with caring 
responsibilities stay in employment and progress in their careers. Legislation giving 
workers rights to such arrangements that are universal and include the right to 
revert to initial employment conditions should improve the labour market position 
of people trying to combine employment with caring responsibilities. But without 
universality, the need for such arrangements can make people pay for the flexibility 
they need in other ways, by trapping them in jobs and grades that allow flexibility, 
but are worse paid or have inferior conditions, pension rights, job protection or 
opportunities for promotion (Hegewisch 2009). 
The effects on intra-household inequalities are therefore contingent. As with 
parental leave, availability and relative take-up by men and women matter: even 
where there are no income or career costs to take-up, there may be intra-
household effects if those working flexibly, even if they take a greater share of 
caring responsibilities, are perceived as contributing less than those with traditional 
full-time jobs (De Henau and Himmelweit 2013b). Where take–up differs, for 
example if men are less willing to work flexibly or have more difficulty in getting 
employers’ agreement to do so, flexible working may also exacerbate intra-
household inequalities through negative effects on women’s job prospects and 
men’s caring roles, (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Himmelweit 2008).  
Effective regulation of maximum working-time so as to reduce full-time working 
hours should have unambiguous effects. It should help increase equality in gender 
roles within households by creating better opportunities for sharing care time and 
family life between parents (Gornick and Heron 2006). Shorter maximum working 
hours should also make full-time employment more attractive to women. Given that 
women tend to work shorter hours than men, such a move should promote greater 
intra-household equality of income as well as gender roles (Himmelweit 2008). A 
similar intra-household equalising effect would be expected from regulations that 
promote parity of pay and working conditions between full-time workers and those 
working on all other types of contracts. 
3.3. Childcare 
The demand for childcare is closely connected to the length of parental leave and to 
policy on working hours. Returning to their jobs after parental leave, parents 
require childcare that is compatible with their hours of employment. Unless 
relatives are available to cover gaps, it is mothers who are likely to take substantial 
periods out of the labour market or take inferior jobs with more compatible hours 
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when their children are small, setting up patterns of earnings and gender roles with 
highly detrimental effects on intra-household equality in the longer-run (De Henau 
et al. 2010a).  
Non-parental care services are therefore necessary for couples with young children, 
or indeed other care responsibilities, if both are to remain in employment. The cost 
to the parents of such care affects how worthwhile it is for a second earner to stay 
in employment or to re-enter the labour market after a break (De Henau et al. 
2010a). And the hours and quality of available care matter too, otherwise families 
may not be able or willing to use it. Since women are most often seen as the 
second worker and primary carer in their households (an effect of both gender 
inequality in the labour market and gender norms), mothers typically have greater 
responsibility for organising and paying for childcare, and its costs are often treated 
as a direct tax on their earnings alone (Himmelweit and Sigala 2004). How much 
has to be paid for childcare therefore has a direct effect on intra-household 
inequalities, and childcare availability affects women's employment options more 
than men’s. Even where men do not change their behaviour, in so far as women 
take up the opportunity to take employment, good quality affordable care services 
improve women’s relative financial position within their households and should 
result in greater equality of caring and earning roles within households. Provided 
that childcare work does not remain such a poorly remunerated profession, and/or 
more men enter into it, childcare that is available and affordable is therefore an 
unambiguously positive contribution to intrahousehold equality (Gornick and Meyers 
2003). 
3.4. Tax-benefit treatment of families 
Most benefit systems in practice reduce intra-household inequalities in income by 
channelling some resources to the lower earner (Figari et al. 2011); progressive 
income tax also helps, though not in systems of joint taxation. However, much of 
the equalising effect of tax and benefit systems happens through the payment of 
benefits for children to mothers; but this is not really money in the mother’s own 
right. Nevertheless, for women who are out of the labour market these payments 
may provide their only direct source of income. Payments for children that go to 
women therefore have an equalising effect on intra-household inequality in 
individual incomes. This is also true if childcare subsidies delivered through the 
benefit system are paid to women, though here the more important effects are on 
incentives.  
Further, if means–tested benefits do not fulfil the criterion of being “money in one’s 
own right” to the same extent as earnings, compensating women through means-
tested benefits for their lower earnings will not be as effective in reducing intra-
household inequalities as equalising earnings. However, contributory benefits that 
are linked to previous employment status or earnings and individually based, such 
as parental leave payments and unemployment benefit, may not have the same 
problem if perceived more as an individual contribution to household income 
(Bennett and Sutherland 2011). In both cases, effects on incentives may be more 
important in the long-run. 
Tax and benefit systems inevitably also influence the employment incentives of 
individuals within households. Progressive individual taxation, by having a higher 
marginal tax rate for higher earners, provides some incentive for equalising gender 
roles and earnings within households. Joint taxation taxes the lower earner at the 
same rate as the higher and therefore does nothing to counteract the specialisation 
in gender roles that the gender pay gap reproduces. A benefit system that uses 
household means testing will undermine individual taxation at the bottom end, by 
clawing back from both partners more of their earnings than the tax system alone, 
and with that addition being clawed back at the same rate for the lower as the 
higher earner (De Henau et al. 2010b). Given that the employment decision for 
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second earners is the more marginal one, and may have to take childcare costs into 
account too, this can work strongly against intra-household equality in gender 
roles, effectively favouring single earner households. Compared with individual 
assessment, joint assessment of household income, whether for progressive 
taxation or for means-tested benefits (including those that are child-related), works 
against intra-household equality in employment and caring roles. 
The effects described above of parental leaves, working time regulations, childcare 
provision and tax-benefit transfers focus on effects on income inequalities and 
differential employment and care incentives for men and women in couples, 
addressing the first two dimensions of our policy evaluation framework. As we have 
seen many such policies have contradictory influences on intra-household 
inequalities by reinforcing intra-household and wider inequalities in gender roles 
and norms, even where they help make incomes within couples more equal. We will 
see in the following sections that these contradictions have not been systematically 
resolved by changes in family-related policies over the last fifteen years in our 
three countries of interest. 
4. Political developments in the UK, Germany and Australia 
4.1. Changes in policy motivations 
Before the mid-1990s, all three countries would have been characterised as strong 
male breadwinner societies, in which women tended to be either full-time carers, or 
if employed, part-time workers (Lewis 2001). In the UK this was largely through 
neglect because the family arrangements so crucial to gender inequalities were 
treated as private and outside the legitimate domain of policy. In Germany after 
unification social policy was dominated by the former West Germany’s positive 
support for the traditional role of the family as the main provider of care 
(Fleckenstein 2010). In Australia, some have argued that the focus was primarily 
on reducing male unemployment, pushing aside concern with gender inequalities 
(Redmond 1999).  
In all three countries, after more than a decade of one party in power, there was a 
switch in the mid 1990s1. Australia's Labor party lost to a right-wing Liberal-
National coalition led by John Howard in 1996. The UK elected Tony Blair and his 
“New” Labour party in 1997 and in 1998 a grand left-wing red-green coalition led 
by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took power in Germany. While Australia 
experienced a move to the right, the other two countries shifted to the left, 
although to a hybrid form of politics: the self declared “third way/neue mitte”, 
which aimed to create a new system of welfare through a range of labour market 
activation policies (Hudson et al. 2008). These ideas were current in Australia too, 
under the influence of OECD initiatives. Although with different underlying 
objectives and through different instruments, all three countries developed policies 
aimed at increasing women’s employment rates, especially those of lone mothers, 
in order to retain skills and raise GDP but also cut spending on out-of-work 
benefits. 
The UK's New Labour government was characterised by its widespread use of the 
terms ‘flexibility and choice’, whereby social inclusion was best achieved through 
employment, and competitiveness in a flexible labour market (Lewis and Campbell 
2007). The state’s role was to facilitate choice, justified because people know what 
is best for themselves, but also because necessary to the efficient working of 
markets (Brennan et al. 2012). However, choices were mainly to be made by 
families, without explicit reference to the individuals making them up, and policy 
                                                 
1 In the UK, the Conservatives ruled unchallenged from 1979 to 1997 led by Prime Ministers Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major; in Australia Labor was in continuous power from 1983 to 1996, led by Bob 
Hawke then Paul Keating; and in Germany, the Christian-Democrats (sometimes in coalition with the 
Liberals) led by chancellor Helmut Kohl were in power from 1983 to 1998. 
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documents showed very little concern with gender equality, inside or outside the 
household. Families were supported, and had a responsibility, to have at least one 
person in employment, but individuals were left to negotiate privately with their 
employers and partners how to allocate their time between employment and care. 
In Australia, similar activation policies (especially for lone parents) were devised by 
successive Howard governments, but the neo-liberal ideology of choice was 
combined with explicit reference to family values, promoting a full-time home care 
role for partnered mothers (Brennan 2007). Australia experienced a clear shift 
towards gender specialisation of roles, turning its back on the "femocrat" policies 
developed by the previous Labor governments that had explicitly promoted men’s 
and women’s equality (Cass 1994). Here too, the family became the main location 
of choice rather than gendered individuals. At the same time, flexible labour 
markets were promoted through decentralised employer-employee arrangements 
(including wage bargaining), undermining Australia’s long-standing judicial 
arbitration of such matters, that had included judgements on family-friendly policies 
for specific industries. These too then became a matter for individual negotiation 
(Brennan 2007). 
German labour market reforms, largely influenced by those in the UK, marked a 
significant departure from the conservative type of welfare state, by promoting a 
third way “welfare to work” approach to tackle persistently high unemployment 
(Fleckenstein 2008). However the Red-Green coalition recognised explicitly that 
increasing employment and promoting an adult worker model required more gender 
equality in both employment and caring roles; hence the development of policies 
that shifted away from Germany’s long-standing support of a traditional gender 
division of roles (Lewis et al. 2008). The rhetoric of choice was also used but was 
more explicitly focused on the constraints impinging on men’s and women’s choices 
to take employment and to care (Lewis and Giullari 2005).  
In the mid- to late-2000s, new governments took over in all three countries. 
Despite some changes in Germany and Australia, reforms brought by these new 
governments were not always out of line with previous policies. In the UK for 
example, the new Conservative led coalition government intensified trends in 
policies introduced by New Labour, such as the focus on “welfare to work”, family-
based means-tested benefits and private provision of child and adult care services. 
However, austerity measures following the financial crash reduced financial support 
for families with children, particularly lone parents, and unleashed significant 
cutbacks in public spending, including crucially in the public services and childcare 
subsidies that women need to take employment. At the same time reforms were 
planned that would systematise family means-testing in the welfare system and 
increase employment incentives for first earners, while reducing them for second 
earners. Critics argued that these moves were due to an ideological commitment to 
the male breadwinner model (Annesley and Bennett 2011). In Germany, radical 
policy reforms, ironically implemented by the new conservative-led coalition, 
increased childcare provision for infants under three and brought in shorter but 
better-paid parental leave with a period reserved exclusively for fathers; these 
reforms had been planned by the previous government, demonstrating 
convergence in the successive governments’ orientations (Fleckenstein 2011). In 
Australia, the new government’s most radical change was the introduction of 
statutory paid parental leave, but employment disincentives for second earners 
provided by the previous government’s family tax benefit system remained 
substantively in place. 
4.2. Results in terms of employment patterns 
These broad policy changes were, explicitly or implicitly, based on, and 
consequently tended to reinforce, a one-and-a-half adult worker household, 
especially for families with dependent children. The most recent statistics from the 
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OECD showed that in 2008, this was the most frequent couple type applying to just 
under 40% of couples with children under 15 in Australia and the UK and slightly 
more in Germany with 44% of such couples (OECD 2013). Among the three 
countries, Australia had the largest proportion of single earner families at 31%, 
compared with 29% in Germany and 25% in the UK; there were more dual full-time 
earner couples in the UK than in the other two countries, with 25% compared to 
21% in Australia and only 17% in Germany. For couple families with a child under 
6, the proportion of single earner (and no earner) couples had declined markedly 
since 1994 in both Germany and the UK; in Germany this was entirely due to the 
growth of one- and a half earner couples, in some of which the woman was 
employed for very few hours. In the UK, the decline of the single earner couple had 
started much earlier with a roughly equal increase in the proportions of dual full-
time and one-and-a-half earner couples from 1994 to 2008 (OECD 2013). Table 1 
summarises the main employment trends since 1997 that had led up to that 
position. 
Table 1: Evolution of employment indicators 1997-2007 
 Australia Germany UK 
 1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007 
Male employment rate 77% 78% 81% 73% 71% 75% 75% 76% 77% 
Female employment rate 60% 63% 67% 56% 59% 64% 63% 65% 66% 
Empl. rate of mothers of 
child<6y 
44% 45% 48% 50% 57% 60% 56% 57% 56% 
Incidence of male part-time 
employment 
15% 12% 12% 4% 6% 8% 8% 9% 10% 
Incidence of female part-time 
employment 
41% 39% 38% 31% 35% 39% 41% 40% 38% 
Gender pay gap (FT) 15% 15% 15% 24% 26% 25% 25% 23% 21% 
Usual weekly hours men  41.4 40.7  40.6 40  42.8 41.8 
Usual weekly hours women  30.7 30.9  31.4 30.2  31.1 31.4 
% PT women involuntary  26.2 24.7  9.3 16.3  5.6 6.5 
% PT men involuntary   42 36.9   30.7 27.9   40.3 41.2 
Source: OECD (2011). 
Between 1997 and 2007, both male and female employment rates increased, 
though women’s increased faster, especially in Germany and Australia. The UK had 
higher rates of female employment at the start of the period, with Australia’s not 
far behind and Germany’s picking up in more recent years. The employment rate of 
mothers with a child of under 6 years old, while lower than in the UK in 1997, rose 
more in both Australia and Germany, with Germany’s catching up with that of the 
UK by 2002 and overtaking it by 2007.  
Men were employed relatively long hours compared to women, with all three 
countries having among the largest differentials in usual hours of employment in 
the OECD (OECD 2011). Women were employed on average only 75% of the hours 
of men. We can also see that the gender pay gap (for those employed full-time) 
was highest in Germany at around 25% but considerably lower in Australia at 15%. 
Only the UK saw a slight decrease in the gender pay gap by 2007. 
5. Specific policy changes and intra-household implications 
We now consider the four policy areas with bearing on intra-household gender 
inequalities on which this paper concentrates: parental leave, working-time, 
childcare, and tax-benefit policies. We give tables below summarising for each 
policy area the main measures in place before the new governments elected in the 
mid 1990s came to power, the changes brought in by those governments and any 
subsequent policy changes after those governments were replaced.  
5.1. Parental Leave systems 
In all three countries parental leave policy has been designed to retain women’s 
skills in the labour market so as to enhance productivity, growth and government 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 3, n. (2013), pp-pp 
ISSN: 2079-5971 12
Jerome De Henau and Susan Himmelweit   Examining public policy from a gendered … 
 
revenues. It has also, generally as a secondary aim, tried to improve the 
opportunities for fathers to participate in caring for babies, on the familialistic 
assumption that one-to-one parental care during a child’s first year is best. In no 
country was the promotion of gender equality the main aim, even in Germany, 
where there was explicit reference to gender equality though focussed more on 
employment than parenting roles (Lewis et al. 2008). 
As we have seen, the particular design of parental leave policies determines 
whether such policies reduce or increase intra-household gender inequalities 
through their effects on both the incomes of mothers and fathers and the 
distribution of caring and earning roles between them. Table 2 summarises the 
main changes in parental leave policy in our three countries.  
Table 2: Effect of new governments in the UK, Australia and Germany in the 
late 1990s on parental leave policies 
 UK (New Labour 
government 1997-2010) 
Australia (Liberal–National 
coalition 1996-2007) 
Germany (Red-Green 
coalition 1998-2005) 
Before - Job protected leave 
for 29 weeks for 
mothers 
- Paid maternity leave 
of 18 weeks; first 6 
weeks at 90% 
earnings 
replacement, 
subsequent 12 weeks 
paid at very low 
uniform rate 
- No paternity or 
parental leave 
- 52 weeks statutory 
job-protected unpaid 
parental leave for the 
family of around time 
of birth (could be 
shared between 
parents).  
- No statutory paid 
leave; some sector and 
enterprise agreements 
included paid 
maternity leave.  
 
- 3-year job-protected 
unpaid parental 
leave (available to 
either but not both 
parents) 
- Paid maternity leave 
of 14 weeks at 
100% earnings 
replacement 
- No specific paternity 
leave 
- Low paid means-
tested childrearing 
benefit available to 
those on leave (or 
employed for less 
than 19 hours a 
week) with a child 
under two 
During - Job protection 
extended to one year 
for mothers 
- Paid maternity leave 
increased to 26 and 
then 39 weeks  
- Fixed rate of pay 
increased but still 
very low 
- Paternity leave of two 
weeks paid at same 
low rate 
- Additional paternity 
leave (after 26 weeks 
mothers could 
transfer any unused 
maternity leave and 
pay to fathers)  
- Unpaid individual 
parental leave (13 
- Introduction of 
individual contracts 
initially reduced 
numbers of workers 
covered by 
agreements that 
include paid maternity 
leave.  
- Some increase in later 
years for those 
employed by large 
organisations. 
- Lump sum Maternity 
Payment (Baby Bonus) 
for all mothers of 
newborns, (not just 
those in employment) 
introduced “as a fairer 
alternative” to paid 
maternity leave (worth 
- Sharing or 
simultaneous take-
up of unpaid 
parental leave by 
parents allowed 
(within family total 
of three years).  
- Third year can be 
taken up to child’s 
8th birthday. 
- Amount of part-time 
employment allowed 
while receiving 
childrearing benefit 
increased from 19 to 
30 hours per week.  
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weeks in first 5 years 
of child’s life)  
less than equivalent of 
14 weeks at minimum 
wage) 
Since - From 2015, if a 
mother does not take 
all her maternity 
leave, after the first 
two weeks any 
remaining leave and 
pay can be taken as 
shared parental leave 
and pay, which can 
be taken jointly or 
separately. 
- Paternity leave 
remains at two weeks 
- Unpaid parental leave 
increased from 13 to 
18 weeks to comply 
with the revised EU 
Parental Leave 
Directive (2010). 
From 2015, can be 
taken up to when 
child aged 18 years. 
- Introduction of 18-
weeks paid parental 
leave in 2011, paid at 
minimum wage, to 
mothers or primary 
carers of an adopted 
child, and 
subsequently 
transferable between 
eligible parents 
(earning less than 3.7 
times average female 
earnings) 
- Two-weeks paid 
paternity leave 
introduced in 2013 (at 
minimum wage) 
- Maternity Payment 
(Baby Bonus) 
continues for those not 
receiving paid parental 
leave (now paid 
fortnightly for 6 
months and subject to 
an income test) 
- Up to a second 12 
months unpaid leave 
can be taken when 
unused by the other 
parent (subject to 
employer’s agreement) 
- From 2007, 
childrearing benefit 
replaced by better 
paid parental 
allowance available 
for just one year. 
- Parental allowance 
earnings-related 
(67% of earnings up 
to a ceiling at 64% 
and a floor at 11% 
of average full-time 
earnings); still 
available at a flat 
rate to those not 
previously in 
employment. 
- Two extra months 
paid parental leave 
reserved for fathers. 
 
Sources: Brennan (2007), Lewis and Campbell (2007), Lewis et al. (2008), Moss (2006, 2012), 
Hegewisch (2009), EFWL (2008), Baird and Murray (2012), Blaxland et al. (2009). 
The UK Labour Government’s approach was to increase the length of paid maternity 
leave in stages, and raise its payment somewhat, although it remained poorly paid 
at well below what a full-time worker would earn on the minimum wage. Fathers 
were allowed only two weeks of equally badly paid leave around the time of the 
birth (Lewis and Campbell 2007). From 2011, mothers could transfer maternity 
leave and pay after the first six months to the father, but this fell short of an 
individual entitlement to paid leave, since it was conditional on the mother’s 
eligibility and return to employment, and take-up was always expected to be low. 
The post-2010 coalition government continued this approach, increasing from 2013 
the flexibility of how leave can be transferred, but leaving it as the mother’s by 
default, and keeping the leave reserved for the father to just two weeks at the time 
of birth. By providing long periods of paid leave targeted at mothers but very little 
reserved for fathers, and paying both very badly, the UK parental leave system is 
therefore likely to reinforce traditional intra-household inequalities in parents’ 
caring and employment roles. 
Australia has had a statutory paid parental leave system only since 2011. 
Compared with the UK’s it is considerably better paid, at minimum wage level 
(about 50% of average female full-time earnings), and of shorter duration, at 18 
weeks, though unpaid leave is available individually to both parents for up to 12 
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months. The Australian paid parental leave system is similar to the UK’s in that it 
goes to the mother by default (as the ‘main carer’), but any unused leave can be 
transferred to the father, provided he also meets its eligibility conditions. The 
introduction of statutory paid parental leave represented a radical shift in 
Australia’s family policy, although many employers had previously provided some 
pay during maternity leave. Yet take-up of both paid and unpaid leave is likely to 
remain gendered, with mothers taking the larger share in the absence of any paid 
leave explicitly reserved for the father (beyond the two weeks paid paternity leave 
introduced in 2013). Therefore, Australian parental leave which is not individual but 
the mother’s by default, like maternity leave in the UK, gives signals that support 
unequal gender norms and roles within households.  
Germany’s reform of its parental leave system was more radical in explicitly 
challenging traditional male breadwinner/female carer assumptions. Already in 
2001, Germany had had made parental leave more flexible by making it available 
individually to either parent, though take-up by fathers remained low. In 2007, the 
new government implemented more radical reforms to increase equality among 
parents in the division of caring and earning roles. These reforms had been 
designed by the previous red-green coalition government to encourage both 
women’s employment and their fertility. The job-protected period of parental leave 
available to either parent was not changed, but the period that was paid was cut to 
one year and its pay was more generous; it became earnings related and no longer 
subject to a means-test, and also paid at a fixed rate also to those not previously in 
employment2. The shorter paid leave period, combined with improved childcare 
provision, was a clear indication of the government’s intention to reduce the long 
periods of sole maternal childcare traditional in West Germany. An additional two 
months of paid leave was reserved for the father; early figures show signs of 
significant increased take-up by fathers, although mainly limited to their two-month 
quota (Moss 2012). The German system is unusual in being specifically designed to 
encourage more sharing of parental roles, with a view to equalising partners’ labour 
market outcomes and earnings. In so far as it is successful in doing so, it is likely to 
promote more equality within households both in incomes and in gender roles. 
However, that all but two months of the parental allowance can be taken by the 
mother and that its maximum pay is only about two thirds of the average wage are 
likely to limit fathers’ take-up in practice, and thus reduce the parental leave 
reform’s effects on intra-household inequality. 
5.2. Working time 
Table 3 summarises the main changes in policy on working time. Both Germany 
and the UK, as members of the EU have to implement its 1993 working time 
directive, which mandated, among other provisions, a maximum 48 hour week for 
all employees. This has been the case in Germany since 1993. In the UK the 
incoming Labour Government implemented it in 1998 the UK with an “individual 
opt-out” whereby an existing employee could “opt” to work longer hours, though 
this could not legally be made a condition of employment; the UK was the only EU 
country to adopt such an opt-out. Australia introduced a “relatively porous” 
maximum 38 hour week in 2009 (Charlesworth and Heron 2012, p. 171). In all 
three countries working hours for men are in practice much longer than the usual 
hours of employment of women. Thus the unequal one-and-a-half-earner model, 
dominant in all three countries, is sustained by long working hours, particularly for 
fathers, making it more likely mothers can only be employed part-time, while the 
large gap between full- and part- time hours makes it hard for women working 
part-time to move into full-time employment. 
                                                 
2 However, in practice the unemployed gain little from the parental allowance because it is taken account 
in assessing other benefits. Although it was in theory extended to them, unemployed and poor parents 
were not the intended beneficiaries of the parental leave reforms. 
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Table 3: Effect of new governments in the UK, Australia and Germany in the 
late 1990s on working time  
 UK (New Labour 
government 1997-2010) 
Australia (Liberal–National 
coalition 1996-2007) 
Germany (Red-Green 
coalition 1998-2005) 
Before - No statutory working 
time legislation  
- No statutory working 
time legislation but 
industrial relations 
court judgements 
limited working hours 
in some industries 
- EU 48 hour 
maximum week 
- Some protection of 
part-time workers 
During - EU 48 hour maximum 
week (implemented 
in 1998 with 
individual opt-out) 
- Right to request 
flexible working (in 
total hours, their 
scheduling and 
location) introduced 
for parents of 
children under 6 
(2003) later extended 
to carers of adults 
(2007) and then to 
all parents with a 
child under 17 (2009) 
- Adoption of the EU 
Directive on part-
time workers (2000) 
which mandates 
equal treatment to 
that of comparable 
full-timers 
- Introduction of 
individual contracts 
reduced number of 
workers covered such 
judgements  
- Protection of carers 
from discrimination 
and obligation on 
employers to make 
reasonable 
adjustments to 
working arrangements 
(NSW and VA) 
 
- Right to change 
working hours if 
employers do not 
object  
- Hartz II reform 
(2003): Fiscal 
incentives to take-up 
mini-jobs increased 
and extended to 
midi-jobs. 
- Adoption of the EU 
Directive on part-
time workers (2000) 
which mandates 
equal treatment to 
that of comparable 
full-timers 
 
 
Since - Plan to extend right 
to request to all 
employees 
- Fair work Act 2009: 
introduces right to 
request flexible 
working (similar to 
UK) for parents who 
care for a pre-school 
child or a child up to 
age 18 years with a 
disability,  
- weekly maximum of 
38 usual employment 
hours plus 
‘reasonable’ additional 
hours 
 
Sources: Brennan (2007), Lewis and Campbell (2007), Lewis et al. (2008), Moss (2006, 2012), 
Hegewisch (2009), EFWL (2008), Baird and Murray (2012), Blaxland et al. (2009), McBride (2000), 
Charlesworth and Heron (2012), Leschke et al. (2006). 
In all three countries, inferior working conditions and pay in part-time employment 
are a significant problem. Attempts were made to remedy this by two approaches. 
Although Germany already had some laws dating back in the eighties protecting 
part-time workers, in 2000, the UK and Germany adopted the EUs 1997 directive 
on part-time employment mandating that part-time workers be employed under the 
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same conditions as comparable full-time workers (Scheele 2000). However in 2003, 
the German Hartz II reform extended existing employees’ tax and insurance 
contribution exemptions applying to marginal employment to the so-called “mini-
jobs”, paying under 400 EUR a month, and abolished any limit on the number of 
exempt hours. “Midi-jobs” were also created to smooth the transition between mini-
jobs and regular employment by tapering the tax and insurance exemption. 
Although this was not conceived primarily as a work-life balance measure, in 
practice these were jobs that could be fitted around care responsibilities. Mothers 
formed the majority taking them up and with joint taxation and social rights 
derived from their spouse they had little financial incentive to earn more (Leschke 
et al. 2006). 
The other approach was to enable workers with caring responsibilities to retain their 
jobs if they needed to work part-time or shift their working arrangements in other 
ways. In the 1990s, and again in 2007 in Australia, all three countries implemented 
some measures to give access to flexible working arrangements, though these 
varied in coverage and levels of protection. Such rights “to request” have helped 
women to stay in jobs where they can use their skills and thus be employed under 
better pay and conditions than if they had to change jobs to have such flexibility. 
Women, especially those with young children, have taken up these measures to a 
far greater extent than men, and are more likely to have requests accepted 
(Hegewisch 2009). As argued earlier, flexible working rights available only to those 
who need to make use of them because of care responsibilities, as in the UK or 
Australia, as opposed to legislation that applies to all workers, as in Germany, 
transmit gender inequalities from the labour market into the home and back again. 
To increase intra-household gender equality in caring and earning roles full-time 
employment hours would need to be limited for all; but policy that achieves this in 
practice has not been successfully pursued by any of the three countries. 
5.3. Childcare and pre-school education 
Table 4 summarises the main changes in childcare policy. Although starting from 
different systems, both Australia and the UK encouraged the development of 
market provision of childcare through granting means-tested fee subsidies for low- 
and middle-income parents, and tax rebates for higher earners, extensive in 
Australia, but much more limited in the UK. The Labour government in the UK 
introduced free part-time pre-school education for all 3-4 year olds that was 
publicly funded but could be publicly or privately provided. Germany’s childcare 
system, based on publicly-funded centres, while extensive for 3 year-olds and over, 
remained underdeveloped for under 3 year olds in the West, but extensive in the 
East. Since 2005 there has been substantial improvement in funding but places still 
fall far short of demand. 
Table 4: Effect of new governments in the UK, Australia and Germany in the 
late 1990s on childcare provision 
 UK (New Labour 
government 1997-2010) 
Australia (Liberal–National 
coalition 1996-2007) 
Germany (Red-Green 
coalition 1998-2005) 
Before - Very limited 
provision, mostly 
expensive private; 
some public provision 
and/or very limited 
subsidies to lone 
parents to enable 
employment and to 
children with 
disabilities  
- Subsidies to non-
profit providers for 
low income parents 
- In 1991 changed to 
subsidising users and 
extended to users of 
accredited for-profit 
providers: Means-
tested childcare fee 
relief (all parents, 
income-test and 
- Publicly subsidised 
legal entitlement to 
part-time (morning) 
coverage for all pre-
school children aged 
3+ 
- Decentralised, very 
limited subsidised 
day-care provision for 
0-2 year olds (more 
in the East but falling 
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longer hours coverage 
for parents in 
employment) 
after reunification) 
During - National Childcare 
Strategy based on 
stimulating demand 
for private provision 
through means-
tested subsidies for 
mid to low income 
parents through the 
tax credit system.  
- To be eligible both 
parents in a couple or 
a lone parent must 
be employed 16 
hours or more 
- Limited tax rebate 
scheme for childcare 
costs for employees 
of participating 
employers.  
- Free part-time pre-
school education 
gradually extended to 
all 3-4yr olds. 
- Introduction of an 
additional childcare 
fee tax rebate 
(capped and 
transferable between 
taxable partners) for 
more affluent parents 
in work (or training or 
looking for work) 
- Growth of ABC 
Learning, chain of 
childcare providers 
that came to 
dominate provision 
(and expand 
internationally). 
Monopoly provider in 
many areas. 
- Not much change 
(slowly increasing 
day-care provision for 
under 3s especially in 
West)  
Since - Percentage of 
childcare costs 
subsidised through 
tax credits cut back 
and income ceiling 
for eligibility lowered. 
- Plans of previous 
government to 
extend free pre-
school education to 
disadvantaged 2-yr 
olds implemented, 
from 2013 
- 20% childcare fee 
subsidy for all but the 
richest parents 
planned for 2015; 
increased subsidy for 
some on benefits 
from 2016. 
- National Quality 
Framework (2012): 
improved child/staff 
ratios and 
qualifications required 
- Changes in the 
regulatory and 
supervisory structure 
(more centralised)  
- Universal entitlement 
to 15 hours a week of 
nursery education for 
one year before 
entering school 
introduced in 2013 
- Collapse of ABC 
Learning 
- Introduction of 
federal funding 
increased direct 
public funding of 
childcare places for 
under 3s with target 
of 35% coverage by 
2013 
- Also from 2013, legal 
right to a childcare 
place from first year 
of child’s life.(with 
controversial plans to 
provide a childcare 
allowance if no place 
is available) 
 
Sources: Brennan (2007), Lewis and Campbell (2007), Lewis et al. (2008), Moss (2006, 2012), 
Hegewisch (2009), EFWL (2008), Baird and Murray (2012), Blaxland et al. (2009), 
http://www.acecqa.gov.au. 
Lack of affordable high quality childcare is another contributor to the one-and-a-
half-earner model prevalent in all three countries. This is a frequent parental 
pattern where publicly-provided childcare is not sufficiently available or provided 
only for short hours, as in Germany, where lack of after-school care is also a 
problem since schools finish at lunch time. Similarly, despite subsidies, privately-
provided childcare is too expensive for many in the UK, so the childcare system 
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relies on mothers working part-time, often supported by grandmothers and other 
relatives providing informal care. Australia’s childcare availability and funding sit 
somewhere in the middle, with more generously subsidised private provision (and 
higher quality provision still largely provided by non-profits), but until recently little 
public recognition of the role of childcare in facilitating maternal employment 
(Mahon et al. 2012). This entrenches an inequality of gender roles in a one-and-a-
half-earner household that, as argued above, not only undermines intra-household 
equality in incomes, but also makes gender equality in power and access to 
resources unlikely to be achieved. 
Changes planned for the future should improve the situation somewhat. More 
childcare places for under threes are planned in both the UK and Germany, though 
for limited hours. The expense of full-time childcare is likely to remain a problem in 
the UK, since increased universal subsidies may simply put up fees charged by for-
profit providers. Similarly the hours of provision remain a problem for mothers in 
full time employment in Germany. By contrast, Australia’s recent reforms focused 
on improving childcare quality rather than coverage, by reorganising its 
supervision, implementing a national quality rating system, and requiring staff 
qualifications and reduced child/staff ratios.  
5.4. Tax-Benefit treatment of families  
Table 5 summarises the main ways in which changes were made to the systems of 
taxation and benefits that are relevant to intra-household inequalities in our three 
countries. The UK and Australia introduced substantial reforms targeting additional 
support on low-income families, particularly those in work, by the introduction of 
family-based means tested tax benefits (Working and Child Tax Credits in the UK 
and Family Tax Benefit A and B in Australia). This partially transformed their 
individually-based tax systems into effectively jointly means-tested systems for 
lower income couples. In Germany, joint taxation of married couples was 
maintained. Moreover, in Germany the long-term unemployed saw their benefit 
reduced in value and subject to a fiercer means-test from 2005. The result was that 
many women lost their entitlement to unemployment benefit in their own right, 
reducing their perceived contribution to their households’ income. A similar change 
by which unemployment pay was replaced by job-seekers allowance, and means-
tested on family income after six months, had been introduced in the UK in 1996, 
with similar effects. 
Table 5: Effect of new governments in the UK, Australia and Germany in the 
late 1990s on the tax-benefit treatment of families 
 UK (New Labour 
government 1997-2010) 
Australia (Liberal–
National coalition 1996-
2007) 
Germany (Red-Green 
coalition 1998-2005) 
Before - Universal child benefit 
paid to mother 
- Individual taxation 
- Low level means-
tested payments to 
low income working 
families 
- Contribution based 
benefits increasingly 
replaced by family 
means-tested safety-
net benefits (including 
unemployment pay 
after six months). 
- Family Allowance 
paid to the primary 
carer “affluence 
tested” i.e. reduced 
for higher income 
families,  
- Additional means-
tested family 
payments (some 
specifically for 
parents caring for 
children at home) 
- Individual taxation 
 
- Universal child 
benefit (paid as cash 
benefit or tax 
allowance to the 
family) – level more 
than twice that of UK 
for 2 children with 
amount per child 
increasing for fourth 
and subsequent 
children 
- Joint taxation of 
married couples 
(income splitting) 
and limited de facto 
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joint taxation of 
divorced couples 
with maintenance 
payment 
During - Development of more 
generous system of 
family-based means-
tested refundable tax 
credits for families in 
work and/or with 
children (including 
childcare support), 
with payments for 
children and childcare 
paid to main carer. 
- Increased labour 
market availability 
(activation) 
requirements for 
benefits (including on 
lone parents and both 
members of couples) 
- Age of youngest child 
at which both 
members of couples 
and lone parents 
required to seek work 
reduced from 12 
(2008), 10 (2009) to 
7 years (2010) 
- Previous means-
tested family benefits 
replaced (and 
amount increased) by 
Family tax benefit A 
introduced for each 
child 
- And additional Family 
tax benefit B paid to 
the sole earner in a 
family; stringent 
income test for 
secondary earner; 
subsequently 
reformed to reduce 
slightly the 
employment 
disincentive to 
second earners 
- Stricter labour 
market requirements 
for benefit receipt 
(including on lone 
parents and both 
members of couples) 
- Hartz IV reform 
(2005) reduced level 
of long-term 
unemployment pay 
and increased 
means-testing to 
take partner’s 
income into account.  
 
Since - Child benefit frozen 
and withdrawn from 
families with a higher 
rate taxpayer  
- Reduction in income 
ceiling for eligibility 
for benefits and tax 
credits; uprating for 
inflation reduced 
- Roll-out from 2013 of 
“Universal Credit” 
(UC) to replace a 
range of previous 
benefits. UC will: 
- increase second 
earner 
disincentives 
- be paid as a single 
monthly payment 
to one person 
- payments for 
children no longer 
paid to main carer  
- No change in the 
structure of Family 
tax benefits (A and 
B) 
- No major change 
 
Sources: Brennan (2007); Lewis and Campbell (2007); Lewis et al. (2008); Moss (2006, 2012); 
Hegewisch (2009); EFWL (2008); Baird and Murray (2012); Blaxland et al. (2009); Fleckenstein (2008). 
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All German parents continued to receive a universal Family Allowance for each 
child, paid either as a cash benefit or a tax allowance. The UK’s less generous Child 
Benefit, paid normally to the mother, was also universal, but for lower income 
families, from 1999, was supplemented by tax credits means-tested on family 
income, paid to the main carer, that could be worth up to twice as much as Child 
Benefit. From January 2013, Child Benefit was withdrawn from high earners 
through the tax system. In Australia, Family Tax Benefit B, which was introduced to 
provide additional income to sole earner families with children, was paid to the tax-
payer rather than the main carer. 
One way to assess the impact of the complex mix of elements in a tax-benefit 
system on intra-household inequalities through differential work incentives is to 
examine the gain to a couple from one or both of them taking employment (OECD 
2007). The average effective tax rate (AETR) gives the percentage of the gain in 
gross family income from taking or increasing employment that is lost through 
reduced benefits and/or increased taxes. Although a couple’s behaviour in response 
to their tax and benefit treatment does not depend on this alone, examining AETRs 
provides a simple way to compare tax-benefit systems and likely behavioural 
responses. This gives us a way of assessing how different systems compare in 
mitigating (or reinforcing) traditional gender roles, and consequent access to 
household resources.  
Table 6 summarises this for the systems that were in place in 2005, adapting 
results from the latest OECD Benefits and Wages report (2007) which simulated 
AETRs for couples at different levels of earnings, both with and without including 
childcare costs. A high AETR means that a high percentage of any additional family 
income is lost through reduced benefits and/or increased taxes, with 100% 
meaning all additional gross income is effectively taxed away. The table focuses on 
couples with a main earner in full-time employment at the national average wage 
(AW) when the other partner takes up a full-time job at two-thirds of AW. The 
table’s results are highly sensitive to those earnings. This is particularly true in the 
UK and Australia, where the clash between individual taxation and the family 
means-testing of many benefits means that a complete analysis would require 
examining many different combinations of partners’ earnings. 
Table 6: Impact of second earner taking employment on net income and 
AETRs, with and without childcare costs, for couples with two pre-school 
children, July 2005 
  
Two earners 
Gross family 
income 167% of 
AW 
One earner 
Gross family 
income 100% of 
AW 
 AU GE UK AU GE UK 
Gross earnings 167 167 167 100 100 100 
Social Assistance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
In-work benefits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Family Benefits 6.8 8.9 6.9 17.7 8.9 6.9 
Housing Benefits 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Income Tax 
-
37.6 
-
31.9 
-
27.7 
-
24.0 
-
11.5 
-
17.5 
SSC 0.0 
-
34.8 
-
14.7 0.0 
-
20.8 -9.2 
Net Income 136 109 131 97 76 80 
Total tax plus 
SSC as % of 
gross income 18% 35% 21% 3% 24% 20% 
 - - -    
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Childcare fee 44.7 16.0 47.8 0 0 0 
Childcare 
benefit/rebates 15.1 6.9 4.7 0 0 0 
Tax reduction 16.4 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 
Other benefits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 
Net cost of 
childcare 
-
13.3 -9.1 
-
43.1 0 0 0 
Net income after 
childcare costs 123 100 88 97 76 80 
Total tax plus 
SSC plus 
childcare costs 
as % of gross 
income 26% 40% 47% 3% 24% 20% 
Second earner’s 
AETR w/o 
childcare costs 41% 51% 24%    
Second earner’s 
AETR with 
childcare costs 61% 65% 88%       
Source: own calculations based on data from OECD (2007) 
Note: First earner is assumed to earn the average weekly wage (AW); 
potential second earner to earn 67% of that. 
Family benefits include both cash benefits and tax credits; SSC = social 
security contributions.  
Table 6 calculates AETRs as they were in July 2005, in families with a first earner 
earning the average wage, for a second earner taking employment. In Australia and 
Germany, with AETRs of 41% and 51% respectively, even when the second earner 
was relatively badly a substantial amount of the extra income was taxed away. This 
illustrates the effect of income tax splitting in the German tax system and of the 
one-earner bias of Australia’s family tax benefit system (mainly part B). With an 
AETR of 24%, the UK system did not tax second earner employment so highly when 
the first earner was earning an average wage. However the household’s AETR 
would have been much higher if the first earner had been earning less because the 
family would have lost more in means-tested tax credits when the second earner 
took a job. This shows the way in which the UK’s tax credit system operates like 
joint taxation at the lower end of the income distribution to disincentivise second 
earner employment.  
So in all countries, the tax-benefit system disincentivises employment for the 
partners of low earners; in Australia and Germany that disincentive applies also to 
households in which the first earner earns average wages, at least when the second 
earner is contemplating employment with earnings similar to those used in Table 6. 
There would be less disincentive to second earner employment for fewer hours, if 
earnings are below the income tax threshold, in the UK and Australian independent 
taxation systems, but not in Germany, where joint taxation means that even the 
lowest earnings of second earners are taxed as highly as their partner’s3. 
However, childcare costs increase the AETR when a second earner takes up 
employment much more in the UK than in the other two countries (to 88% for the 
couple considered in Table 6). This effect would be reduced if either partner earned 
less since a larger proportion of childcare costs would be subsidised, but it would 
still be the case that the most expensive childcare costs in Europe combined with a 
maximum subsidy of 70% up to a ceiling (which is considerably less than the 
average cost of full-time childcare) provide a significant disincentive to second 
                                                 
3 Indeed, second earners are often initially taxed at even higher rates than their higher earning partners, 
with the subsequent annual adjustment arriving too late for the value of the second earner’s contribution 
to household income to be fully understood by many couples. 
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earner employment when childcare has to be purchased. For the UK, that is one 
reason why so many mothers of pre-school children work part-time. 
Recent or planned reforms of tax-benefit systems are not likely to modify this 
picture, at least at these levels of earnings. Indeed, the introduction of the 
Universal Credit in the UK replacing tax credits and nearly all other means-tested 
benefits with a single monthly payment to just one member of a couple, will further 
entrench family means-testing and worsen second earner disincentives for lower 
income families. In Germany, so long as the join taxation prevails, the disincentive 
will remain, and the Australian family tax benefit structure was not fundamentally 
changed by the subsequent Labor government despite modest increases in the 
threshold for means-testing the earnings of a second-earner. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examined four domains of family-related policy reforms and considered 
the multiple ways in which they theoretically could, and in practice were likely to 
have, influenced intra-household inequalities, focusing particularly on effects on 
individual incomes and on gender roles with respect to employment and caring. The 
analysis revealed that over a period of fifteen years in which there were significant 
changes in the political orientation of governments in our three countries, the one-
and-a-half-earner couple became reinforced as the norm around which policy was 
often designed, especially in the presence of young children.  
Despite starting with different patterns of employment and care relations that had 
been developed under somewhat different policy orientations, policies in the three 
countries converged to some extent in their effects on intra-household inequalities. 
While in all three countries policies were successful in increasing women’s labour 
market participation, especially that of mothers of young children, they tended also 
to reinforce women’s roles as primary carers and secondary earners. As a result, 
these reforms did little to tackle intra-household gender inequalities, an issue that 
was ignored by policy makers in their emphasis on ‘familial choice’. These policies 
succeeded in supporting families, or at least for one member, in moving from 
“welfare to work”, but partners were left to negotiate privately their allocation of 
time and financial resources, which tended to reinforce the existing division of 
earning and caring roles. 
However, a few specific policies may have contributed to reducing intra-household 
inequalities in the short and the longer-term by encouraging some more equal 
sharing of roles between partners. In Germany, the reduction of the length of paid 
parental leave and the introduced of some leave reserved for fathers reduced the 
number of mothers dropping out of the labour market entirely after parental leave 
and led to somewhat greater involvement of fathers in caring for children, at least 
in their first year. All countries introduced some in-work support to lone parents 
that must have helped improve partnered mothers’ fall-back positions, hence 
potentially reducing intra-household inequalities among intact couples. And more 
generally, the expansion of childcare in all three countries was a positive move 
towards improving women’s position in the labour market, and thus within 
households, even if it did not go far enough in terms of affordability and meeting 
demand. 
Whenever politicians have removed practical constraints on men and women 
equalising gender roles, by the provision of free childcare or attractive parental 
leave for fathers for example, parents have responded in favour of greater intra-
household equality by taking up these options (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011, Moss 
2012). Policies that promote a traditional division of gender roles tend to go against 
the general aspirations of couples, who are showing increasingly egalitarian gender 
role attitudes (ISSP 1994, ISSP 2002, Lewis et al. 2008). If those aspirations get 
translated into voting intentions we could see more attention paid by policy makers 
in the future to the effects of their policies on intra-household inequalities. 
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